Statistical evidence for Iranian election fraud?

June 18, 2009 by Sam Wang

In the wake of continuing turmoil over the disputed Iranian election, enough information is available to do some validation of the results. There are several types of information – examples can be seen here and here.

This type of data can be used to look for fraud. Crude fraud can be found by applying Benford’s law, which states that for many categories of data, including vote counts, the first digits of lists of observations are not uniformly distributed (as one would naively expect) but instead skewed toward low values. There are more sophisticated tests as well. Prof. Walter Mebane at the University of Michigan is knowledgeable about such analysis and is applying the methods to the data from the recent Iranian election. In addition to intrinsic peculiarities such as Benford’s law, he is also using 2005 election data as a baseline to help discover unexpected anomalies.

He currently says “”I think the results give moderately strong support for a diagnosis that the 2009 election was affected by significant fraud.” I haven’t had time to go over his analysis, but here it is for interested readers, along with a ZIP file of source code and data. Note that he is still updating his analysis, so regard this as an interim report.

Later on I’ll take a critical look at this and other approaches to detecting fraud, with the idea of arriving at a synthesis – and possible conclusions.

Thanks to David Shor and Andrew Gelman for making this connection.

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8 Comments

Hossein says:

Hi,
Could you please check this out? Prof. Mebane said before that result conform Benford’s law, and in the new edited version, he says that it seems to be a fraud.

David Shor says:

Hossein,
Once he conditioned the results on 2005 first round results that became available to him, he found discrepancies that made him change his conclusion.

Sam Wang says:

Note that applying Benford’s law for the first digit might be a problem depending on how districts are set up. If they are designed to be of approximately equal size then there might be a bias. For example, in the report from Poland (I’ll blog about this later) the preponderance of leading 7’s could be explained this way.
This is why Mebane is using the second-digit Benford’s law, a subtler but probably more reliable test.

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[…] Statistical evidence for Iranian election fraud? Prof. Walter Mebane at the University of Michigan is knowledgeable about such analysis and is applying the methods to the data from the recent Iranian election. In addition to intrinsic peculiarities such as Benford’s law, he is also using 2005 election data as a baseline to help discover unexpected anomalies. […]

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