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                    [post_author] => Sam Wang
                    [post_date] => August 17, 2022
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                    [post_title] => A framework for thinking about democracy reform
                    [post_slug] => a-framework-for-thinking-about-democracy-reform
                    [post_url] => https://election.princeton.edu/articles/a-framework-for-thinking-about-democracy-reform/
                    [post_content] => 

This year, I'm highly focused on the preservation and improvement of democracy. (There will still be horserace coverage for longtime readers. That's coming soon!)

My fundamental motivation is this: I think there’s hope for our democracy, and I want to deploy data and science to help understand the best way forward. For many of you, an optimistic sentiment may seem out of place. After all, we have a host of problems that include erosion of individual rights, an enormous gulf between the major parties, partisan gerrymandering, loss of faith in institutions, war, and climate change. Sounds bad, right?

Actually, there’s hope. I’ve been applying data analytics to study elections and campaigns here since 2004. Since 2013 I’ve been working to help reformers across the nation (the Princeton Gerrymandering Project). My conclusion is that achieving change is difficult but possible. For example, despite what you’ve heard, gerrymandering is actually on the decline in many places - and competition is higher than in 2012. To get effective and lasting change, it would help to understand what we’re doing and measure the effects accurately.

I’m a working scientist with an interest in using my craft to understand how and why our democracy has gone off track. Science and analysis can help in different ways: understanding how we got where we are today, finding the underlying reasons why the system isn’t working, and designing ways to get us on track.

In the weeks and months ahead I’ll pursue five major themes:

A unifying framework for understanding democracy’s breakdown. Modern conditions have overwhelmed the American system of democracy. For much of the 20th century, politics was complex, in a good way. It was possible to find a mixture of opinions within a geographic region or within a political party. Attitudes toward economic equality, the role of government, civil rights, abortion, guns, and other issues cut one another and across party lines, a quality that I will call “multidimensionality.” Differences were resolved by a variety of intra-party processes and general election mechanisms - and the civil rights movement expanded these mechanisms to encompass more and more people.

This complexity has largely become degraded into a single dimension. This is what we mean when we say that politics are “polarized.” Two poles define a line, and a line is one-dimensional. With the urban/rural divide, rapid long-distance social communication, and other forces has come a great coalescence of politics into a single political dimension of left-to-right. That collapse creates a recipe for political polarization and even instability. It can account for the growing presence of authoritarian and anti-democracy tendencies in the U.S. I’ll argue that the concept of low political dimensionality has explanatory power - and helps us think about solutions. I will use this framework to investigate reforms that have the potential to reduce the impact of these destabilizing forces.

What chokepoints make democracy unresponsive? The current system has many features that make government unresponsive to citizens. For example, if the only local election that matters is a party primary, and you’re not in that party, then you’re out of luck. Rules that used to be moderately problematic - legislators drawing their own districts, or first-past-the-post elections - are now bugs in our democracy, and make it harder to resolve political conflicts.

Reforms that work - and why. In the last decade, reform has started to pop up around the country. Some of those reforms can make a difference, as has occurred in redistricting. These reforms are real but incomplete. To address problems in democracy, can the next wave of reforms such as ranked-choice voting succeed? When might such an idea fail? What is the practical route for achieving the reforms? Understanding these successes and failures might shape our thinking about the next wave of change.

Optimizing your efforts. How can we give citizens more leverage, yet also maintain a political system that is stable and builds toward the long term? This is going to take varied efforts: local and national, short-term and long-term, by individuals and institutions. I’ll write about how to optimize your efforts, whether it’s choosing which local races give you the most leverage during a campaign season, or joining a years-long reform effort. In all cases the goals are nonpartisan, and are focused on what it takes to build a responsive, functional, and stable democracy.

Using science to get us there. In all of this, my contribution is based on data and science. In my day job, I analyze data and build conceptual models. This work requires data analysis, computer modeling, and a willingness to work between technical disciplines. It’s difficult work, I make mistakes, and I’m always learning. But I harbor a deep conviction that systems-level scientific thinking can help us understand and repair our national mess.

There will be plenty of data and technical analysis. Here at PEC, and over at the Gerrymandering Project we don't shy away from math. The freedom to put the quantitative work in the foreground is one reason I am pursuing this means of communication, rather than newspapers and magazines. They have an essential role, but sometimes one wants to go deeper with data.

Welcome!

[post_excerpt] => This year, I’m highly focused on the preservation and improvement of democracy. (There will still be horserace coverage for longtime readers. That’s coming soon!) My fundamental motivation is this: I think there’s hope for our democracy, and I want to deploy data and science to help understand the best way forward. For many of you, […] [topics] => Array ( ) ) [1] => Array ( [id] => 2182 [post_author] => Sam Wang [post_date] => August 13, 2022 [raw_post_date] => DateTime Object ( [date] => 2022-08-13 23:50:00.000000 [timezone_type] => 3 [timezone] => UTC ) [post_title] => All pain, whose gain? The surprising implications of a new legal theory for redistricting [post_slug] => the-independent-state-legislature-theorys-hidden-beneficiaries [post_url] => https://election.princeton.edu/articles/the-independent-state-legislature-theorys-hidden-beneficiaries/ [post_content] =>

(cross-posted with my new Substack)

Lots of pixels have been spilled on a legal theory once considered fringe, the Independent State Legislature doctrine. This theory threatens to wreak havoc with centuries of election law. Two upcoming Supreme Court redistricting cases cite this doctrine. Both are brought by Republican-controlled legislatures, so you’d think it would be of net benefit to their party. I did the math. Like the web ads say, the answer might surprise you.

Until recently, the theory was considered radical. It is based on Article I and II of the Constitution, which assign state-level power to regulate federal elections to legislatures. In two cases, Moore v. Harper and Costello v. Carter, lawyers representing Republican legislators question how much of a role the word “legislature” leaves for state courts.

A favorable ruling would go against precedents going back to George Washington’s first term of office. Ironically, the North Carolina General Assembly itself, represented in Moore v. Harper, passed a law two decades ago explicitly handing authority over redistricting to the state Supreme Court they now oppose. But recent Supreme Court rulings – on abortion, on religious expression, and on election law – make clear that the Court is unafraid to break from the past when there’s power or policy at stake.

If the Supreme Court does rule in favor of the theory, voters across the nation will take a major hit in the form of fewer competitive seats. Legislators generally draw safer districts than courts or independent commissions. I have analyzed ten states whose redistricting will potentially be affected by the ISL doctrine. In these states, up to 25 competitive Congressional districts would be replaced by single party-drawn plans. That’s over half of the competitive districts drawn this year! (Contrary to what is being said out there, there’s actually a fair lot of competition in the new maps. That’s a topic for a different day.)

The Independent State Legislature theory would disrupt the partisan balance that has emerged in many states. To determine this, I estimated what a party-blind redistricting process would produce in the ten states* that would be currently affected by the theory. The Princeton Gerrymandering Project has performed computer simulations** and used fairness metrics to identify neutral ranges of outcomes. Only two states, both under single-party control, have outcomes outside the range, Florida (R) and Maryland (D). Left unchecked, single-party control would let the other eight states join them.

However, Congressional power is determined not by single states, but by their combined total representation. So let’s add it all up.

In Mooreoverturning court oversight in North Carolina might net three Congressional seats for Republicans. But these seats would potentially be offset by two other states: New York and Maryland. In New York, a court-appointed special master redrew a Congressional map drawn by Democrats that is expected to elect between one and three more Republicans than the legislature’s map. In Maryland, a Democratic seat was made competitive. Applying a win in Moore to all three states would lead to nearly no change in power. Net change: zero, plus or minus one.

A more radical solution is proposed by Pennsylvania legislators in Costello, who suggest that in case of an impasse between the legislature and governor, state courts should be constrained by a federal law that gives a fallback plan. Representatives would be elected under the old lines, or if the number of representatives changes due to reapportionment, by statewide at-large election. In 2020, Pennsylvania was won by Joe Biden, and lost a seat with the new Census. At-large elections would likely have given Democrats an additional nine seats. Whichever way Pennsylvania votes in 2024, the stakes would be increased enormously. Net change: up to nine seats, but which way?

Although it’s not mentioned in the cases before the Supreme Court, there are additional interpretations of the Independent State Legislature theory. Which party do these interpretations help?

First, the theory might eliminate citizen redistricting commissions. Currently, citizens can bring initiatives to the ballot in about 25 states. The establishment of independent redistricting commissions by this route has been a success story for reform. Voters have used this mechanism in Arizona, California, and Michigan. For reformers of both parties and no party, it would be a bitter pill if power reverted to the legislature. In Arizona, the enacted map gets an A grade from the Princeton Gerrymandering Project, with two Democratic seats, four Republican seats, and three competitive seats. An all-Republican legislative process might turn those three competitive seats red. But in California, with its 52 total Congressional districts, the Democratic legislature and governor would be able to draw a map that elects four or five additional Democrats. So overturning independent commissions in these two states might net Democrats an additional one or two seats. (It is worth noting that in Michigan, benefits would go to whichever party wins this fall’s legislative and governor’s elections. This is one case in which Republicans stand to gain, since Democrats seem unlikely to overturn the work of an independent commission.)

In perhaps the most aggressive interpretation of the independent state legislature theory, the Court could say that a governor cannot veto a legislature’s actions. This year, two Congressional redistricting battles involved Republican governors fighting their own party. In Florida, Governor Ron DeSantis wanted (and got) a map that elected up to four more Republicans than the legislature’s plan. In New Hampshire, Governor Chris Sununu got a map that made a safe Republican seat more competitive for Democrats. In Wisconsin, Democratic governor Tony Evers didn’t get his way – but the old map, which was Republican-drawn in 2011, was used. In these three states, the net effect of eliminating the governor would be a net gain of up to three more Congressional seats for Democrats.

In summary, almost any interpretation of the Independent State Legislature theory would have effects on Congressional redistricting over the next few years that are close to neutral on average, but often favor Democrats. Such an outcome may give conservatives on the Supreme Court pause. 

How is it that such a theory could help Democrats and hurt Republicans? The answer lies in the last decade. In past decades, much reform energy has come from a variety of states, including swing states, where partisan gerrymandering pays off the most. Republicans have taken a more aggressive approach to redistricting, and in many places they have already maxed out their gains.

But neither party should want this change, which replaces a longstanding system of court intervention with a Wild West scenario. This Supreme Court case has profound long-term consequences that go well beyond Congressional districting.

State-level action is the one major route left for reformers to check the runaway power of legislatures, which themselves are often gerrymandered. More broadly, as my colleagues and I have written, every state constitution has provisions that can be used to protect voting rights. Ballot measures like ranked-choice voting can increase competition and de-emphasize extreme candidates. And the theory has potential implications for the selection of Presidential electors. If the Supreme Court blocks these uses of federalism, recovering and strengthening our troubled national democracy will become much harder.

*Arizona, California, Florida, Maryland, Michigan, New Hampshire, New York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin.

**The Gerrymandering Project didn’t do simulations in California. With so many districts, the compute time was too long to meet the Project’s goal of doing 1 million simulations in each state. Instead one can use statewide metrics (though these are imperfect by themselves) and example hypothetical maps that show extremes.

[post_excerpt] => (cross-posted with my new Substack) Lots of pixels have been spilled on a legal theory once considered fringe, the Independent State Legislature doctrine. This theory threatens to wreak havoc with centuries of election law. Two upcoming Supreme Court redistricting cases cite this doctrine. Both are brought by Republican-controlled legislatures, so you’d think it would be […] [topics] => Array ( [house] => House [redistricting] => Redistricting [supreme-court] => Supreme Court ) ) [2] => Array ( [id] => 711 [post_author] => Sam Wang [post_date] => September 21, 2021 [raw_post_date] => DateTime Object ( [date] => 2021-09-21 14:13:00.000000 [timezone_type] => 3 [timezone] => UTC ) [post_title] => The NYC Board of Elections has doxxed at least 378 voters [post_slug] => the-nyc-board-of-elections-has-doxxed-at-least-378-voters [post_url] => https://election.princeton.edu/articles/the-nyc-board-of-elections-has-doxxed-at-least-378-voters/ [post_content] =>

Here at the Electoral Innovation Lab, we’ve been analyzing New York City’s mayoral primary election. It uses a new system, ranked-choice voting, that is meant to resolve differences and reach consensus. It’s the largest such election in the United States to date, with close to 1 million votes cast.

Unfortunately, the management of this election has faced problems. Here, Jesse Clark, Lindsey Cormack (of Stevens Institute of Technology), and I found that it was possible to re-identify at least 378 cast-vote records, assigning them to the voter who cast them. This destroys the privacy of their vote, a serious violation of the New York State Voter’s Bill Of Rights. One of the votes revealed is that of Dante de Blasio, the Mayor’s son.

Here’s coverage at the New York Times and Gothamist. Read our original Electoral Innovation Lab report here.

[post_excerpt] => Here at the Electoral Innovation Lab, we’ve been analyzing New York City’s mayoral primary election. It uses a new system, ranked-choice voting, that is meant to resolve differences and reach consensus. It’s the largest such election in the United States to date, with close to 1 million votes cast. Unfortunately, the management of this election […] [topics] => Array ( [politics] => Politics ) ) [3] => Array ( [id] => 699 [post_author] => Sam Wang [post_date] => January 20, 2021 [raw_post_date] => DateTime Object ( [date] => 2021-01-20 08:46:00.000000 [timezone_type] => 3 [timezone] => UTC ) [post_title] => Building democracy back better [post_slug] => building-democracy-back-better [post_url] => https://election.princeton.edu/articles/building-democracy-back-better/ [post_content] =>

Today at noon, Joe Biden and Kamala Harris will be inaugurated as President and Vice-President. In addition to all the new policies and priorities they will implement and develop, it’s a relief. Over the last four years, democracy hit a modern low point. Now we face a long challenge: how to repair our system and make it better.

Four years ago, many problems were already apparent: an incoming President who lost the popular vote, running on a divisive platform, who had no demonstrated interest in governing; a Senate that held back a Supreme Court appointment from the outgoing President; and a breakdown in the centrality of facts and disclosure in how we conduct our national politics.

I would say that the subsequent years turned out to be every bit as bad as expected by pessimists (for example see our Authoritarian Checklist). And all the divisions, corruption, and criminality got worse, with two (two!) impeachments. Today, with a new President, might seem like a relief. We get to see experienced government officials, and can hope for repairs to agencies ranging from the State Department to the Post Office. And the new Senate 51-50 majority will at least consider bills that until now have been bottled up by the Majority Leader.

However, most of these problems preceded Trump, and the core causes of the problems aren’t going away by themselves: issue polarization, economic inequality, and outdated democratic institutions. Which is why I’ve become increasingly committed to helping us build back. Our new Electoral Innovation Lab is focused on understanding ways to make democracy more representative and responsive to all citizens, and to reduce the ways in which election rules magnify polarization. We’re going to do this with a combination of law, data, and quantitative research.

There are new wrinkles: a potentially inaccurate Census, and the fact that we have to work on a state-by-state level now that the Supreme Court is newly hostile to voting and redistricting rights. With the help of external collaborators and student projects, we’re working to address these problems.

Voting rules are our other area of emphasis. Voting rules such as plurality-winner elections can reward determined factions, electing winners with a minority of opinion. When the voters who decide the election (i.e. the pivotal voters) are different from representative voters (i.e. the median voters), extremists can take charge.

Given where voter polarization has headed, this is a recipe for disaster. In the January 6th certification of electors, Congresspersons who voted to overthrow the election tended to come from deeply Republican districts. In Michigan, Ohio, and Pennsylvania, the 16 votes to overthrow came from districts that were won with 64.9% of the vote, compared with 12 votes to certify from districts that were won with 59.9% of the vote. In lopsided districts, politicians only have to face primary voters.

There is a weird surprise here: gerrymandering may have mitigated the sedition problem in Michigan and Ohio. With a deeply disruptive issue like election certification, districts that were engineered to be near-ish to the 50% win threshold aren’t so safe any more. In Michigan and Ohio, which are aggressively gerrymandered, incumbents in close districts have to think about whether they’re going to fall below 50%, ending up as what political scientist Bernie Grofman calls a dummymander – a gerrymander that cut things too close. Politicians can tell when they’re close to the edge, and so it’s no surprise that Michigan and Ohio had split GOP caucuses on the certification vote. Redistricting reform will not help this problem. It will change how many GOP representatives are elected – but their districts might be more partisan – which could inadvertently feed extremism.

Instead, a better way to address extremist representatives is a change to voting rules. Reforms like open primaries and ranked-choice voting can make legislators answerable to all voters, not just their core supporters. An important part of the Electoral Innovation Lab is Open Primaries, a partner whose mission is to reform primaries. Here at Princeton, we are interested in understanding where these reforms are likely to work best. Part of the goal is to understand how different reforms may collide. For example, based on what I’ve said, redistricting reform may make voting-rule reform more important as a tool to reduce extremism.

Here’s the bigger point: To truly repair and strengthen democracy, we have to understand that different reforms address different problems. Fair districting fixes one kind of problem (representational harm), and voting rules fix another problem (individual winners aren’t truly representative). Democracy’s a complex system of rules. In the coming years, reformers have to think like engineers or doctors, and know which intervention will work, and where.

We’re exploring other areas of research as well. We aim to do a combination of practical policy work and high-quality research to repair democracy. I hope you will follow and support our work in the years ahead.

Happy inauguration!

Sam Wang

Director, Electoral Innovation Lab

[post_excerpt] => Today at noon, Joe Biden and Kamala Harris will be inaugurated as President and Vice-President. In addition to all the new policies and priorities they will implement and develop, it’s a relief. Over the last four years, democracy hit a modern low point. Now we face a long challenge: how to repair our system and […] [topics] => Array ( [2020-election] => 2020 Election [us-institutions] => U.S. Institutions ) ) [4] => Array ( [id] => 695 [post_author] => Sam Wang [post_date] => December 3, 2020 [raw_post_date] => DateTime Object ( [date] => 2020-12-03 08:33:00.000000 [timezone_type] => 3 [timezone] => UTC ) [post_title] => Postdoctoral positions at our new Electoral Innovation Lab! [post_slug] => postdoctoral-positions-at-our-new-electoral-innovation-lab [post_url] => https://election.princeton.edu/articles/postdoctoral-positions-at-our-new-electoral-innovation-lab/ [post_content] =>

Want to apply your intellectual skills to real-life reform? The Electoral Innovation Lab (an expansion of the Princeton Gerrymandering Project) is searching for postdocs! Our mission is to apply law, science, and math to strengthening U.S. democracy. Example topics include redistricting, ranked-choice voting, and open primaries.

We see our work as relating to political science in the same way that technology and engineering relate to the basic sciences. Our goal is to serve as a pipeline from fundamental research to practical application. To read about some of our priorities, see this Research Agenda. And here’s a slideshow of our story. (Side note for friends and supporters: invite me to talk about the Lab – it’s more fun to talk about it!)

Many disciplines are welcome! We welcome applicants from all the natural sciences, as well as social and behavioral sciences. We expect that these positions will be of particular interest to people in the fields of political science and law.

Your work will seed important research with significant implications for the years ahead. Please apply!

[post_excerpt] => Want to apply your intellectual skills to real-life reform? The Electoral Innovation Lab (an expansion of the Princeton Gerrymandering Project) is searching for postdocs! Our mission is to apply law, science, and math to strengthening U.S. democracy. Example topics include redistricting, ranked-choice voting, and open primaries. 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