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	<title>Comments on: Covert decisionmaking and the Bradley effect</title>
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	<link>http://election.princeton.edu/2008/10/28/covert-decisionmaking-and-the-bradley-effect/</link>
	<description>A first draft of electoral history</description>
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		<title>By: Philip Stoddard</title>
		<link>http://election.princeton.edu/2008/10/28/covert-decisionmaking-and-the-bradley-effect/comment-page-1/#comment-1630</link>
		<dc:creator>Philip Stoddard</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 02 Nov 2008 20:26:21 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://election.princeton.edu/?p=2070#comment-1630</guid>
		<description>Sam, I enjoyed your paper in Brain Behavior &amp; Evolution.  I had no idea you were the same Sam Wang.  Now I&#039;m doubly impressed.  When do you sleep?</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Sam, I enjoyed your paper in Brain Behavior &amp; Evolution.  I had no idea you were the same Sam Wang.  Now I&#8217;m doubly impressed.  When do you sleep?</p>
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		<title>By: Andre Washington</title>
		<link>http://election.princeton.edu/2008/10/28/covert-decisionmaking-and-the-bradley-effect/comment-page-1/#comment-1523</link>
		<dc:creator>Andre Washington</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sat, 01 Nov 2008 01:52:50 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://election.princeton.edu/?p=2070#comment-1523</guid>
		<description>At this point there are no undecided voters. Just undeclared voters. These are the Bradley voters that the experts say will break heavily to McCain.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>At this point there are no undecided voters. Just undeclared voters. These are the Bradley voters that the experts say will break heavily to McCain.</p>
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		<title>By: Oz Observer</title>
		<link>http://election.princeton.edu/2008/10/28/covert-decisionmaking-and-the-bradley-effect/comment-page-1/#comment-1490</link>
		<dc:creator>Oz Observer</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 31 Oct 2008 13:52:19 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://election.princeton.edu/?p=2070#comment-1490</guid>
		<description>when thinking about how elections are held..and won, I think the &quot;Wigwam&quot;convention of 1860 is a fine example of an exciting drama which happened to produce a miraculously good result. I&#039;ve always thought of the many parallels between Obama and Lincoln (Illinois, one term in Congress, opposed a jingoistic foreign war etc) and  if you compress the time frame, Obama winning over the Super delegates is much the same as the Lincoln team&#039;s  victory in Chicago.  Let&#039;s hope his victory doesn&#039;t provoke an Alaskan Secession!</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>when thinking about how elections are held..and won, I think the &#8220;Wigwam&#8221;convention of 1860 is a fine example of an exciting drama which happened to produce a miraculously good result. I&#8217;ve always thought of the many parallels between Obama and Lincoln (Illinois, one term in Congress, opposed a jingoistic foreign war etc) and  if you compress the time frame, Obama winning over the Super delegates is much the same as the Lincoln team&#8217;s  victory in Chicago.  Let&#8217;s hope his victory doesn&#8217;t provoke an Alaskan Secession!</p>
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		<title>By: Frank</title>
		<link>http://election.princeton.edu/2008/10/28/covert-decisionmaking-and-the-bradley-effect/comment-page-1/#comment-1460</link>
		<dc:creator>Frank</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 30 Oct 2008 11:27:23 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://election.princeton.edu/?p=2070#comment-1460</guid>
		<description>John (the) Zogby on C-SPAN just said that last night&#039;s media blitz was &quot;optimally&quot; timed, in terms of days to election, for the undecided voter.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>John (the) Zogby on C-SPAN just said that last night&#8217;s media blitz was &#8220;optimally&#8221; timed, in terms of days to election, for the undecided voter.</p>
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		<title>By: Bruce (B)</title>
		<link>http://election.princeton.edu/2008/10/28/covert-decisionmaking-and-the-bradley-effect/comment-page-1/#comment-1459</link>
		<dc:creator>Bruce (B)</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 30 Oct 2008 09:05:08 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://election.princeton.edu/?p=2070#comment-1459</guid>
		<description>It has its merits, but I think the time for the Electoral College may have passed a century or two ago. It&#039;s like old MS-DOS code stuck in your OS. I don&#039;t think you will ever make a radical and sudden change to the system, though. Amending the Constitution takes time and may face opposition, but there is an easier way. The simplest solution is a &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.nationalpopularvote.com/pages/explanation.php&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;National Popular Vote&lt;/a&gt;. 
&lt;i&gt;Under the U.S. Constitution, the states have exclusive and plenary (complete) power to allocate their electoral votes, and may change their state laws concerning the awarding of their electoral votes at any time. Under the National Popular Vote bill, all of the state’s electoral votes would be awarded to the presidential candidate who receives the most popular votes in all 50 states and the District of Columbia. The bill would take effect only when enacted, in identical form, by states possessing a majority of the electoral votes—that is, enough electoral votes to elect a President (270 of 538).&lt;/i&gt;</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>It has its merits, but I think the time for the Electoral College may have passed a century or two ago. It&#8217;s like old MS-DOS code stuck in your OS. I don&#8217;t think you will ever make a radical and sudden change to the system, though. Amending the Constitution takes time and may face opposition, but there is an easier way. The simplest solution is a <a href="http://www.nationalpopularvote.com/pages/explanation.php" rel="nofollow">National Popular Vote</a>.<br />
<i>Under the U.S. Constitution, the states have exclusive and plenary (complete) power to allocate their electoral votes, and may change their state laws concerning the awarding of their electoral votes at any time. Under the National Popular Vote bill, all of the state’s electoral votes would be awarded to the presidential candidate who receives the most popular votes in all 50 states and the District of Columbia. The bill would take effect only when enacted, in identical form, by states possessing a majority of the electoral votes—that is, enough electoral votes to elect a President (270 of 538).</i></p>
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		<title>By: NeuvoLiberal</title>
		<link>http://election.princeton.edu/2008/10/28/covert-decisionmaking-and-the-bradley-effect/comment-page-1/#comment-1457</link>
		<dc:creator>NeuvoLiberal</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 30 Oct 2008 07:57:23 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://election.princeton.edu/?p=2070#comment-1457</guid>
		<description>Sam, just came across your site. Nice work! I like your method/approach for getting the precise probability distribution profile for electoral college outcomes. 

Do you have &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.scilab.org/&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;scilab&lt;/a&gt; versions of your matlab scripts? Since scilab is free, everyone can run the scilab version of the scripts on their computers, if available . I&#039;ll try to find some time to try and convert the scripts and I may drop you an email on this. -- best, NL</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Sam, just came across your site. Nice work! I like your method/approach for getting the precise probability distribution profile for electoral college outcomes. </p>
<p>Do you have <a href="http://www.scilab.org/" rel="nofollow">scilab</a> versions of your matlab scripts? Since scilab is free, everyone can run the scilab version of the scripts on their computers, if available . I&#8217;ll try to find some time to try and convert the scripts and I may drop you an email on this. &#8212; best, NL</p>
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		<title>By: Todd S. Horowitz</title>
		<link>http://election.princeton.edu/2008/10/28/covert-decisionmaking-and-the-bradley-effect/comment-page-1/#comment-1451</link>
		<dc:creator>Todd S. Horowitz</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 29 Oct 2008 20:39:21 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://election.princeton.edu/?p=2070#comment-1451</guid>
		<description>@ Snowball

&quot;On a side note- Proportional allocation of EVs would also make sure that winning the popular vote wins you the election (well, with a much higher probability anyway).&quot;

This would only be true if there were no third parties involved. As I noted earlier, if a sufficiently popular third party denied the leading candidate a majority of the electoral votes, then the election is determined by the House of representatives, which is if anything a less representative vote than the electoral college. Also, proportional representation would not eliminate the distortion caused by allocating proportionally more electoral votes to small states than to large ones. If you&#039;re interested in ensuring that the President is the winner of the popular vote, then you should just endorse a popular vote.

However, the proportional allocation system would have one important advantage: it would eliminate the &quot;battleground state&quot; phenomenon, where candidates are campaigning in (and therefore paying attention to the needs of ) only states where the outcome is not in doubt. Unde the current system, my vote in Massachusetts is largely a pointless gesture, and no one is going to try to get me to vote for them. Under a proportional system, McCain would have an interest in enlarging his share of the Massachussetts vote, even if it were less than 50%, while Obama would have an interest in denying votes to McCain. In that case, public transit funding might actually be discussed in the campaign!

In any case, I don&#039;t see any advantage to proportionally dividing up the electoral votes that would not accrue from simply abolishing the electoral college and going for a straight popular vote.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>@ Snowball</p>
<p>&#8220;On a side note- Proportional allocation of EVs would also make sure that winning the popular vote wins you the election (well, with a much higher probability anyway).&#8221;</p>
<p>This would only be true if there were no third parties involved. As I noted earlier, if a sufficiently popular third party denied the leading candidate a majority of the electoral votes, then the election is determined by the House of representatives, which is if anything a less representative vote than the electoral college. Also, proportional representation would not eliminate the distortion caused by allocating proportionally more electoral votes to small states than to large ones. If you&#8217;re interested in ensuring that the President is the winner of the popular vote, then you should just endorse a popular vote.</p>
<p>However, the proportional allocation system would have one important advantage: it would eliminate the &#8220;battleground state&#8221; phenomenon, where candidates are campaigning in (and therefore paying attention to the needs of ) only states where the outcome is not in doubt. Unde the current system, my vote in Massachusetts is largely a pointless gesture, and no one is going to try to get me to vote for them. Under a proportional system, McCain would have an interest in enlarging his share of the Massachussetts vote, even if it were less than 50%, while Obama would have an interest in denying votes to McCain. In that case, public transit funding might actually be discussed in the campaign!</p>
<p>In any case, I don&#8217;t see any advantage to proportionally dividing up the electoral votes that would not accrue from simply abolishing the electoral college and going for a straight popular vote.</p>
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		<title>By: Bruce W</title>
		<link>http://election.princeton.edu/2008/10/28/covert-decisionmaking-and-the-bradley-effect/comment-page-1/#comment-1450</link>
		<dc:creator>Bruce W</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 29 Oct 2008 20:34:01 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://election.princeton.edu/?p=2070#comment-1450</guid>
		<description>Sam, thanks for your response.  I think the only way to be sure about the allegiance-switching behavior would be to poll not only people&#039;s current choice, but the recent history of their preferences (though it would probably be more accurate to just poll the same people multiple times to see how many change their preference and how often).

On another note, I wonder if there is something analogous to the Bradley effect when some people are questioned about their previous voting behavior and current intent to vote.  There may be people who tell the pollster that they voted in the last election and they intend to vote in this one because they think they are supposed to vote and there is a certain stigma associated with not voting.  So maybe they&#039;re really not likely voters at all.  The recent Pew poll indicates that they tend to be little old ladies living in the northeast who aren&#039;t well educated and go to church regularly -- if that group can&#039;t decide between Obama and McCain by now, they&#039;re probably not going to vote at all.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Sam, thanks for your response.  I think the only way to be sure about the allegiance-switching behavior would be to poll not only people&#8217;s current choice, but the recent history of their preferences (though it would probably be more accurate to just poll the same people multiple times to see how many change their preference and how often).</p>
<p>On another note, I wonder if there is something analogous to the Bradley effect when some people are questioned about their previous voting behavior and current intent to vote.  There may be people who tell the pollster that they voted in the last election and they intend to vote in this one because they think they are supposed to vote and there is a certain stigma associated with not voting.  So maybe they&#8217;re really not likely voters at all.  The recent Pew poll indicates that they tend to be little old ladies living in the northeast who aren&#8217;t well educated and go to church regularly &#8212; if that group can&#8217;t decide between Obama and McCain by now, they&#8217;re probably not going to vote at all.</p>
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		<title>By: Todd S. Horowitz</title>
		<link>http://election.princeton.edu/2008/10/28/covert-decisionmaking-and-the-bradley-effect/comment-page-1/#comment-1449</link>
		<dc:creator>Todd S. Horowitz</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 29 Oct 2008 20:29:05 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://election.princeton.edu/?p=2070#comment-1449</guid>
		<description>@Snowball
The system of proportional representation you propose works for a parliamentary system. In theory, states in the US could allocate their representation in Congress in this fashion. However, my point was that it won&#039;t work for the Electoral College. Even if states divided up their electoral votes for president according to the proportion of votes for each (qualified) party, your votes for the Rainbow Granola Party are still &quot;wasted&quot; (except insofar as they convince the Democrats to go for the granola vote in the next election).

If we switched to a parliamentary system, the problem doesn&#039;t go away entirely. Now you have someone who represents you ideologically (though not geographically, since there&#039;s a tradeoff between having a local rep and having proportional representation), but since governments in such systems typically require coalitions of several parties, you have a less direct impact on who actually governs the country, since the coalitions have to be worked out in &quot;backroom deals&quot; between the parties.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>@Snowball<br />
The system of proportional representation you propose works for a parliamentary system. In theory, states in the US could allocate their representation in Congress in this fashion. However, my point was that it won&#8217;t work for the Electoral College. Even if states divided up their electoral votes for president according to the proportion of votes for each (qualified) party, your votes for the Rainbow Granola Party are still &#8220;wasted&#8221; (except insofar as they convince the Democrats to go for the granola vote in the next election).</p>
<p>If we switched to a parliamentary system, the problem doesn&#8217;t go away entirely. Now you have someone who represents you ideologically (though not geographically, since there&#8217;s a tradeoff between having a local rep and having proportional representation), but since governments in such systems typically require coalitions of several parties, you have a less direct impact on who actually governs the country, since the coalitions have to be worked out in &#8220;backroom deals&#8221; between the parties.</p>
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		<title>By: Snowball</title>
		<link>http://election.princeton.edu/2008/10/28/covert-decisionmaking-and-the-bradley-effect/comment-page-1/#comment-1448</link>
		<dc:creator>Snowball</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 29 Oct 2008 20:12:36 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://election.princeton.edu/?p=2070#comment-1448</guid>
		<description>I forgot to mention something obvious, but important- 

Some countries with proportional representation will only allow candidates to be elected to parliament from parties that reach a certain threshold of the national vote (e.g. 5%). So a candidate with strong localized support -for example- cannot be elected. This also ensures that you don&#039;t end up with a dozen parties struggling to pass legislation.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I forgot to mention something obvious, but important- </p>
<p>Some countries with proportional representation will only allow candidates to be elected to parliament from parties that reach a certain threshold of the national vote (e.g. 5%). So a candidate with strong localized support -for example- cannot be elected. This also ensures that you don&#8217;t end up with a dozen parties struggling to pass legislation.</p>
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