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	<title>Comments on: The undecided brain</title>
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	<link>http://election.princeton.edu/2008/10/27/the-undecided-brain/</link>
	<description>A first draft of electoral history</description>
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		<title>By: Mathphysto</title>
		<link>http://election.princeton.edu/2008/10/27/the-undecided-brain/comment-page-1/#comment-1453</link>
		<dc:creator>Mathphysto</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 29 Oct 2008 22:11:03 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://election.princeton.edu/?p=2047#comment-1453</guid>
		<description>Thanks, I do plan to get the book, perhaps as an Xmas gift :)  

My main question wasn&#039;t about how evidence is biased via perception, etc.  Rather, I was wondering how overloading of working memory is understood at the neural level, particularly in the context of decision-making.  In other words, I&#039;m wondering how information-loss functions at the neural level.  

More generally, why is there a limit to short-term memory, even outside of decision-making tasks (e.g., Miller&#039;s 7 +/- 2 result)?  What happens to the information neurally, how does it just &#039;disappear&#039;?  

Is it a lack of necessary pre-existing synapses, so that some firing patterns just hit dead-ends?  Or some sort of signal attenuation when there are too many firing patterns competing for shared resources?

Maybe I should just read the book, huh?</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Thanks, I do plan to get the book, perhaps as an Xmas gift :)  </p>
<p>My main question wasn&#8217;t about how evidence is biased via perception, etc.  Rather, I was wondering how overloading of working memory is understood at the neural level, particularly in the context of decision-making.  In other words, I&#8217;m wondering how information-loss functions at the neural level.  </p>
<p>More generally, why is there a limit to short-term memory, even outside of decision-making tasks (e.g., Miller&#8217;s 7 +/- 2 result)?  What happens to the information neurally, how does it just &#8216;disappear&#8217;?  </p>
<p>Is it a lack of necessary pre-existing synapses, so that some firing patterns just hit dead-ends?  Or some sort of signal attenuation when there are too many firing patterns competing for shared resources?</p>
<p>Maybe I should just read the book, huh?</p>
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		<title>By: Sam Wang</title>
		<link>http://election.princeton.edu/2008/10/27/the-undecided-brain/comment-page-1/#comment-1427</link>
		<dc:creator>Sam Wang</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 29 Oct 2008 12:50:43 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://election.princeton.edu/?p=2047#comment-1427</guid>
		<description>&lt;b&gt;Frank&lt;/b&gt; - Your point is basically correct. Just as donations are most effective in &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.actblue.com/page/meta-analysis-08&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;knife-edge races&lt;/a&gt;, a 1% jump has a relatively big effect on the win probability. Realistically, a 20% jump is a reasonable measure of change in certainty. Also, at this point in the season I use more than 3 recent polls in most close states.

&lt;b&gt;Mathphysto&lt;/b&gt; - You are asking fascinating questions. Contrary to popular belief, emotions play an essential positive role in decision-making. As I have written in &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.amazon.com/Welcome-Your-Brain-Puzzles-Everyday/dp/1596912839&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;&lt;i&gt;Welcome To Your Brain&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/a&gt;, emotions tell us when an event is important, positive or negative. When people have brain damage that impairs their ability to link emotion with higher processes, they become horrendously indecisive. It&#039;s fairly well understood - read my book! Of course such a mechanism can be overactivated.

In regard to biases, there&#039;s no such thing as unbiased integration of information. All information comes in against a backdrop of prior evidence. These &quot;priors,&quot; as they are called, guide us to accept some evidence more than others. This is essential for survival in the natural world. 

In political decision-making, there&#039;s no feedback that corresponds to survival. Voting for Democrats or Republicans doesn&#039;t get you eaten, mostly. Even when you vote for a party that drives the economy into the ground (or allows the U.S.S. Cole to be attacked, or whatever your favorite bad event may be), it wasn&#039;t your personal doing. So biases stick around.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><b>Frank</b> &#8211; Your point is basically correct. Just as donations are most effective in <a href="http://www.actblue.com/page/meta-analysis-08" rel="nofollow">knife-edge races</a>, a 1% jump has a relatively big effect on the win probability. Realistically, a 20% jump is a reasonable measure of change in certainty. Also, at this point in the season I use more than 3 recent polls in most close states.</p>
<p><b>Mathphysto</b> &#8211; You are asking fascinating questions. Contrary to popular belief, emotions play an essential positive role in decision-making. As I have written in <a href="http://www.amazon.com/Welcome-Your-Brain-Puzzles-Everyday/dp/1596912839" rel="nofollow"><i>Welcome To Your Brain</i></a>, emotions tell us when an event is important, positive or negative. When people have brain damage that impairs their ability to link emotion with higher processes, they become horrendously indecisive. It&#8217;s fairly well understood &#8211; read my book! Of course such a mechanism can be overactivated.</p>
<p>In regard to biases, there&#8217;s no such thing as unbiased integration of information. All information comes in against a backdrop of prior evidence. These &#8220;priors,&#8221; as they are called, guide us to accept some evidence more than others. This is essential for survival in the natural world. </p>
<p>In political decision-making, there&#8217;s no feedback that corresponds to survival. Voting for Democrats or Republicans doesn&#8217;t get you eaten, mostly. Even when you vote for a party that drives the economy into the ground (or allows the U.S.S. Cole to be attacked, or whatever your favorite bad event may be), it wasn&#8217;t your personal doing. So biases stick around.</p>
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		<title>By: Mathphysto</title>
		<link>http://election.princeton.edu/2008/10/27/the-undecided-brain/comment-page-1/#comment-1417</link>
		<dc:creator>Mathphysto</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 29 Oct 2008 01:40:35 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://election.princeton.edu/?p=2047#comment-1417</guid>
		<description>Sam, thanks for the great site!  I&#039;ve been lurking for a while here and have made it part of my election-coverage diet. 

What about errors in the decision-making process?  Specifically, what is happening neurologically when a voter decides to support a candidate that they mistakenly believe agrees with their own views on several issues?  

I&#039;m thinking in particular of cases where cognitive overload leads a voter to forget a candidate&#039;s platform/past record on some issues when integrating the evidence to make a decision.  Many people make their decisions without writing down the evidence and organizing it in a systematic way, so there seems to be plenty of room for such errors.  Who can easily juggle evidence on a few dozen major multi-faceted issues to make a decision that optimally represents their own intrinsic opinions?  Seems like it would easily exceed the short-term memory abilities people have.   

Do the neural patterns corresponding to certain pieces of evidence just &#039;drop out&#039; from the decision-making process?  Or maybe there is some sort of piece-wise evidence integration process that starts with a decision based on one &#039;chunk&#039; of evidence (perhaps the most important), then adds another chunk and &#039;recalculates&#039; the decision, and repeats this process until the evidence is accounted for?  Essentially like a finite series starting from a zeroth approximation, then adding a first, second, etc, until you get the final result. 

Relatedly, do you have any idea about the degree to which emotion can alter the decision-making process?  My intuition says it would be able to cause evidence to be (a) re-weighted (a special-case of this being ignorance, i.e., zero weighting), and/or (b) altered in perception/interpretation.  But I&#039;m not sure how well the neural end of this is known.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Sam, thanks for the great site!  I&#8217;ve been lurking for a while here and have made it part of my election-coverage diet. </p>
<p>What about errors in the decision-making process?  Specifically, what is happening neurologically when a voter decides to support a candidate that they mistakenly believe agrees with their own views on several issues?  </p>
<p>I&#8217;m thinking in particular of cases where cognitive overload leads a voter to forget a candidate&#8217;s platform/past record on some issues when integrating the evidence to make a decision.  Many people make their decisions without writing down the evidence and organizing it in a systematic way, so there seems to be plenty of room for such errors.  Who can easily juggle evidence on a few dozen major multi-faceted issues to make a decision that optimally represents their own intrinsic opinions?  Seems like it would easily exceed the short-term memory abilities people have.   </p>
<p>Do the neural patterns corresponding to certain pieces of evidence just &#8216;drop out&#8217; from the decision-making process?  Or maybe there is some sort of piece-wise evidence integration process that starts with a decision based on one &#8216;chunk&#8217; of evidence (perhaps the most important), then adds another chunk and &#8216;recalculates&#8217; the decision, and repeats this process until the evidence is accounted for?  Essentially like a finite series starting from a zeroth approximation, then adding a first, second, etc, until you get the final result. </p>
<p>Relatedly, do you have any idea about the degree to which emotion can alter the decision-making process?  My intuition says it would be able to cause evidence to be (a) re-weighted (a special-case of this being ignorance, i.e., zero weighting), and/or (b) altered in perception/interpretation.  But I&#8217;m not sure how well the neural end of this is known.</p>
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		<title>By: Michael S</title>
		<link>http://election.princeton.edu/2008/10/27/the-undecided-brain/comment-page-1/#comment-1410</link>
		<dc:creator>Michael S</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 28 Oct 2008 21:23:37 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://election.princeton.edu/?p=2047#comment-1410</guid>
		<description>Rather than considering that stunned deer in the headlights look as a sign of stupidity consider instead the reaction as being confirmation that the decision is innate.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Rather than considering that stunned deer in the headlights look as a sign of stupidity consider instead the reaction as being confirmation that the decision is innate.</p>
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		<title>By: Frank</title>
		<link>http://election.princeton.edu/2008/10/27/the-undecided-brain/comment-page-1/#comment-1409</link>
		<dc:creator>Frank</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 28 Oct 2008 21:17:56 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://election.princeton.edu/?p=2047#comment-1409</guid>
		<description>Sam: I think it’s unrealistic that (a) there are only 11 states that are not sure bets (p &gt; .995) for Obama or McCain and (b) all of those states favor the leader by more than two-to-one. (Yesterday it was 10 states and, except for a tie, four-to-one.) It seems to me that the margins are all being divided by around 2% to get the z-scores that yield the probabilities in your input file. That is, the z-scores are basically scaled versions of the margins, and because the margins tend to increase by 1% the z-scores increase by ½ which raises the probabilities rapidly. If you’re tied one day and lead by 1% the next, your win probability jumps from 50% to 69%. Please straighten me out if I’m wrong, as I assume I am.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Sam: I think it’s unrealistic that (a) there are only 11 states that are not sure bets (p &gt; .995) for Obama or McCain and (b) all of those states favor the leader by more than two-to-one. (Yesterday it was 10 states and, except for a tie, four-to-one.) It seems to me that the margins are all being divided by around 2% to get the z-scores that yield the probabilities in your input file. That is, the z-scores are basically scaled versions of the margins, and because the margins tend to increase by 1% the z-scores increase by ½ which raises the probabilities rapidly. If you’re tied one day and lead by 1% the next, your win probability jumps from 50% to 69%. Please straighten me out if I’m wrong, as I assume I am.</p>
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		<title>By: Sam Wang</title>
		<link>http://election.princeton.edu/2008/10/27/the-undecided-brain/comment-page-1/#comment-1399</link>
		<dc:creator>Sam Wang</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 28 Oct 2008 17:51:33 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://election.princeton.edu/?p=2047#comment-1399</guid>
		<description>Paul, these are good points. I wrote about biased assimilation of information in a previous NYT editorial, &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/27/opinion/27aamodt.html&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;here&lt;/a&gt;.  These types of phenomena are also covered in &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/1596912839&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;my book&lt;/a&gt;.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Paul, these are good points. I wrote about biased assimilation of information in a previous NYT editorial, <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/27/opinion/27aamodt.html" rel="nofollow">here</a>.  These types of phenomena are also covered in <a href="http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/1596912839" rel="nofollow">my book</a>.</p>
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		<title>By: Paul</title>
		<link>http://election.princeton.edu/2008/10/27/the-undecided-brain/comment-page-1/#comment-1398</link>
		<dc:creator>Paul</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 28 Oct 2008 17:45:52 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://election.princeton.edu/?p=2047#comment-1398</guid>
		<description>Sam - I wonder if the attention on undecided voters isn&#039;t a bit misplaced, as it is the difficulty in persuading decided voters to switch that would seem to predict the accuracy of polls.  It seems that a lot of the analysis of polls (both in the media and in some of the projection websites) treat percentage differences as equivalent (i.e., leading 46%-42% is the same as leading 53%-49%). However, I think that the value of polling at or above 50% (accounting for margin of error) has a particular value in that it requires voters to change their previously stated decisions. I am a psychologist (PhD is in clinical, but I have a lot of background in social psych as well),  and the majority of research in my field suggests that people look to make confirmatory decisions rather than differential ones - which is to say that once people have made a decision, they are more likely to seek out and attend to information that supports their decision rather than undercuts it, and are also more likely to interpret ambiguous information as supportive. Indeed, I believe that studies have even shown that forcing someone to make a decision (i.e., without giving them enough information to decide) influences their future behavior and processing of confirmatory vs. incongruent information.
Given that Obama is polling at or around 50% in numerous swing state polls, this would seem to suggest (given the accuracy of the polls) that it is the currently decided rather than the undecided voters that will determine the outcome of this election, as McCain can not win without convincing some decided voters to change their minds.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Sam &#8211; I wonder if the attention on undecided voters isn&#8217;t a bit misplaced, as it is the difficulty in persuading decided voters to switch that would seem to predict the accuracy of polls.  It seems that a lot of the analysis of polls (both in the media and in some of the projection websites) treat percentage differences as equivalent (i.e., leading 46%-42% is the same as leading 53%-49%). However, I think that the value of polling at or above 50% (accounting for margin of error) has a particular value in that it requires voters to change their previously stated decisions. I am a psychologist (PhD is in clinical, but I have a lot of background in social psych as well),  and the majority of research in my field suggests that people look to make confirmatory decisions rather than differential ones &#8211; which is to say that once people have made a decision, they are more likely to seek out and attend to information that supports their decision rather than undercuts it, and are also more likely to interpret ambiguous information as supportive. Indeed, I believe that studies have even shown that forcing someone to make a decision (i.e., without giving them enough information to decide) influences their future behavior and processing of confirmatory vs. incongruent information.<br />
Given that Obama is polling at or around 50% in numerous swing state polls, this would seem to suggest (given the accuracy of the polls) that it is the currently decided rather than the undecided voters that will determine the outcome of this election, as McCain can not win without convincing some decided voters to change their minds.</p>
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		<title>By: Helen Good</title>
		<link>http://election.princeton.edu/2008/10/27/the-undecided-brain/comment-page-1/#comment-1397</link>
		<dc:creator>Helen Good</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 28 Oct 2008 17:42:45 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://election.princeton.edu/?p=2047#comment-1397</guid>
		<description>Norman F. Dixon’s 1976 book ‘On the Psychology of Military Incompetence’ gives early decision making as one cause of military incompetence. He gives examples of intelligence reports being ignored because a decision had already been taken. He describes a psychological inability to hear new information that corrects the defective information on which the decision was based.

If you see this elsewhere, it was posted in error, it is meant to be here.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Norman F. Dixon’s 1976 book ‘On the Psychology of Military Incompetence’ gives early decision making as one cause of military incompetence. He gives examples of intelligence reports being ignored because a decision had already been taken. He describes a psychological inability to hear new information that corrects the defective information on which the decision was based.</p>
<p>If you see this elsewhere, it was posted in error, it is meant to be here.</p>
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		<title>By: Andrew Foland</title>
		<link>http://election.princeton.edu/2008/10/27/the-undecided-brain/comment-page-1/#comment-1393</link>
		<dc:creator>Andrew Foland</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 28 Oct 2008 16:32:04 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://election.princeton.edu/?p=2047#comment-1393</guid>
		<description>Chris Hayes also wrote of his &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.chrishayes.org/articles/decision-makers/&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;experience of canvassing undecideds in 2004&lt;/a&gt;.  My favorite line:

&lt;i&gt;More often than not, when I asked undecided voters what issues they would pay attention to as they made up their minds I was met with a blank stare, as if I&#039;d just asked them to name their favorite prime number. &lt;/i&gt;</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Chris Hayes also wrote of his <a href="http://www.chrishayes.org/articles/decision-makers/" rel="nofollow">experience of canvassing undecideds in 2004</a>.  My favorite line:</p>
<p><i>More often than not, when I asked undecided voters what issues they would pay attention to as they made up their minds I was met with a blank stare, as if I&#8217;d just asked them to name their favorite prime number. </i></p>
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		<title>By: ndam</title>
		<link>http://election.princeton.edu/2008/10/27/the-undecided-brain/comment-page-1/#comment-1390</link>
		<dc:creator>ndam</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 28 Oct 2008 15:19:10 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://election.princeton.edu/?p=2047#comment-1390</guid>
		<description>David Sedaris has a very funny description of being undecided in this weeks New Yorker:

http://www.newyorker.com/humor/2008/10/27/081027sh_shouts_sedaris?printable=true</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>David Sedaris has a very funny description of being undecided in this weeks New Yorker:</p>
<p><a href="http://www.newyorker.com/humor/2008/10/27/081027sh_shouts_sedaris?printable=true" rel="nofollow">http://www.newyorker.com/humor/2008/10/27/081027sh_shouts_sedaris?printable=true</a></p>
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